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ABSTRACT 
In the last three decades, considerable theoretical and empirical research has been 
undertaken on the topic of moral distress among health professionals. Understood as a 
psychological and emotional response to the experience of moral wrongdoing, there is 
evidence to suggest that – if unaddressed – it contributes to staff demoralization, 
desensitization and burnout and, ultimately, to lower standards of patient safety and quality 
of care. However, more recently, the concept of moral distress has been subjected to 
important criticisms. Specifically, some authors argue that the standard account of moral 
distress elucidated by Andrew Jameton (1984) does not refer to a discrete phenomenon 
and/or that it is not sufficiently broad and that this makes measuring its prevalence among 
health professionals, and other groups of workers, difficult if not impossible.  
In this paper we defend the standard account of moral distress. We understand it as a 
concept that draws attention to the social, political and contextual determinants of moral 
agency and brings the emotional landscape of the moral realm to the fore.  Given the 
increasing pressure on health professionals worldwide to meet efficiency, financial and 
corporate targets and reported adverse effects of these for the quality and safety of patient 
care, we believe that further empirical research that deploys the standard account moral 
distress is timely and important.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The philosopher, Andrew Jameton, first deployed the term ‘moral distress’ in 1984 in order 
to capture what he then perceived as an emerging  feature of the professional role of nurses 
– that they were unable to act in a way that was consistent with their moral values and 
beliefs because of institutional obstacles. While empirical researchers initially described and 
analysed the experiences of moral distress among critical care nurses (Rodney 1988; Corley 
1995), the intervening years have seen an increase in research based in a wide variety of 
settings including: paediatric care, psychiatry, gerontology, oncology and hematology 
(Hamric 2012; Oh & Gastmans 2013). Journals directed at medical as well as nursing 
professionals have also begun to include theoretical and empirical papers on moral distress 
such as AJOB, Bioethics, Bioethical Inquiry, Hastings Center Report, JME and HEC Forum.  The 
notion of moral distress has also received attention in the media, e.g., a New York Times 
article on moral distress, published in 2009 by Pauline Chen, elicited 299 comments on the 
blog, Medicine and Moral Distress, and most of these were posted in the first month after 
the initial article was published (Chen 2009; Parker 2009). In sum, research on moral distress 
now refers to a wide range of nursing professionals as well as other health professionals and 
allied workers e.g. doctors, pharmacists, midwives, social workers and students. Qualitative 
and quantitative research with these various groups of health professionals indicates that 
moral distress negatively impacts the well-being of health professionals, staff burnout and 
retention as well as the quality and safety of patient care (Dodek et al. 2016; Hamric, 
Borchers, & Epstein 2012; Huffman & Rittenmeyer 2012; Lamiani, Borghi, & Argentero 2015; 
Oh & Gastmans 2013). 
Alongside the growing body of empirical research on moral distress, increasing attention has 
also been paid to the way in which moral distress has been defined and understood. This 
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paper engages primarily with those authors who have critically considered the way in which 
the concept of moral distress has been originally delineated and successively 
operationalized.  Firstly, we describe and explain Jameton’s original definition of moral 
distress and we briefly outline the way in which this standard definition has been deployed 
in empirical research. Secondly, we explain and respond to a key challenge that has recently 
been proposed in relation to Jameton’s account of moral distress – that it should be more 
broadly defined. Finally, we recommend that Jameton’s account of moral distress could be 
strengthened if greater attention were paid to the emotional dimension of the moral realm 
that we believe Jameton’s account draws attention to.  
 
The standard definition of moral distress 
Jameton’s now familiar definition of moral distress describes it as arising ‘when one knows 
the right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it nearly impossible to pursue the 
right course of action.’(Jameton 1984, p.6) His original account of moral distress focussed on 
the way in which institutional policies and practices as well as co-workers can prevent nurses 
from acting in ways that they are convinced is morally appropriate - they are unable to do 
what they know to be the right thing. He later expanded the definition when he 
distinguished between ‘initial’ and ‘reactive’ distress: 
‘Initial distress involves the feeling of frustration, anger, and anxiety people experience 
when faced with institutional obstacles and conflict with others about values. Reactive 
distress is the distress that people feel when they do not act upon their initial distress.’ 
(Jameton 1993, p. 544)  
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Here, Jameton explicitly refers to the psycho-emotional responses that may accompany the 
failure to act in a morally appropriate way.  The following report of a nurse’s experience of 
moral distress is a hybrid case drawn from the first piece of empirical research on moral 
distress that deploys Jameton’s definition. It indicates that nurses face institutional obstacles 
and collegial resistance leading to moral wrong-doing and, ultimately to feelings of anxiety, 
self-doubt, helplessness, hurt and anger: 
 
‘I have to do things I think are wrong’ 
‘I was always taught to do as written. I have gone to the “powers that be” and complained. I 
have talked to the physician about it. Their response is to do nothing. Jobs are hard to come 
by … It’s not like I could just quit, although I’d like to. And … I like nursing. I was thinking I 
might be wrong – that maybe I’m biased … What if I’m wrong? Maybe I didn’t have the 
backbone to refuse … I’m really tired of that whole system … it hurts too much to have to 
spend a lot of time with those patients because you know you’re helpless to change the 
situation for them … I think what it’s done is make me decide to get out of nursing because I 
don’t like being in a situation where I feel helpless or continually have to deal with situations 
where I have to do things I think are wrong. (Wilkinson 1987/88, pp.23-24) 
In the three decades since Jameton first introduced it, his particular delineation  of moral 
distress has, for the most part, been the standard definition deployed in the qualitative 
(Huffman & Rittenmeyer 2012), quantitative (Lamiani et al. 2015; Oh & Gastmans 2013), and 
argument-based literature (McCarthy & Gastmans 2015). This research has generally 
addressed the following dimensions of moral distress:  
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(1) clinical settings e.g. critical care, and clinical circumstances e.g. aggressive interventions 
in conditions of medical futility or at the end of life, that give rise to moral distress (Corley 
1995; Lamiani et al. 2015); 
(2) the nature of external constraints (e.g., staff shortages, institutional policies and 
asymmetries of power and authority) and internal constraints (e.g., lack of resolve and 
ethical incompetence) that prompt individuals to act, or desist from acting, in a morally 
appropriate way (Varcoe, Pauly, & Webster 2012; Wilkinson 1987/88); 
(3) the normative meaning of moral distress involving moral judgement, moral agency, 
conscience, moral, personal and professional integrity (McCarthy & Gastmans 2015); 
(4) the short and long term psychological, emotional and physiological effects on individuals 
that follow on their failure to do what they believe to be the morally right thing (Epstein & 
Hamric 2009; Webster & Bayliss 2000); 
(5) the (usually negative) impact on patient care, on the personal and professional lives of 
health professionals and their retention in practice (Austin 2012; Dodek et al. 2016; Pauly, 
Varcoe & Storch 2012). 
 
Definitional challenges 
Despite the general consensus as to the phenomenon of MD and its relevant features, some 
authors have also found fault with Jameton’s conceptualization of moral distress, and the 
empirical research studies that have operationalized it (Fourie 2015; Hanna 2004; Johnstone 
& Hutchinson 2015; Morley et al 2017; McCarthy & Deady 2008; Repenshek 2009). One 
worry is that the term moral distress does not pick out a discrete phenomenon or set of 
phenomena, in essence, that it is not possible to carve the moral realm up at the joints so 
that some experiences can be distinguished as genuine expressions of moral distress 
	 6	
(Johnstone & Hutchinson 2015; McCarthy & Deady 2008). Critics point to the absence of any 
agreement on the key features of the concept and, in turn, the difficulties involved in 
devising tools to measure it adequately (Campbell et al 2016; Fourie 2015; Johnstone & 
Hutchinson 2015; Morley et al 2017; McCarthy & Deady 2008).  
In a recent article, Carina Fourie goes to the heart of the problem, when she claims that 
Jameton’s definition of moral distress is unsatisfactory because it refers both to the cause of 
distress as well as to the distress itself:   
‘Jameton’s discussion prompts the question – what kind of phenomenon is moral distress 
then? Is it a psychological response to an ethical phenomenon? Or is it the phenomenon 
that prompts the response? Another way of asking this is, is it meant to be an outcome or 
the possible cause of that outcome? Although Jameton does not make this clear, his 
discussion of moral distress implies that it is both.’ (Fourie 2015, p.93) 
 
On Fourie’s view, Jameton understands moral distress as a ‘compound phenomenon’ which 
includes  both the aetiology and the symptoms of moral distress:  the ethical cause (e.g., 
institutional  requirements that constrain moral agency) and the psychological states of 
distress that may follow when a person feels compelled to act against their core moral 
beliefs and values. As Fourie suggests, ‘combining’ the ethically relevant cause – institutional 
constraints – with psychological responses is confusing and muddies the waters for empirical 
researchers. Moreover, for Fourie, positing institutional constraint as a necessary condition 
of moral distress, is needlessly narrow. It implies that other morally relevant experiences are 
not counted as legitimate causes of moral distress. Fourie argues that there are a range of 
‘morally relevant’ experiences of distress in addition to those caused by moral constraint 
such as those that may be prompted by moral conflict and uncertainty about how to act in a 
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morally appropriate way. In effect, she rejects the distinction that Jameton makes between 
situations involving ethical dilemmas or conflicts and situations involving moral constraint 
and moral distress. Her revised definition posits moral distress as a single phenomenon that 
is triggered by a range of possible causes: 
 
‘Moral distress is a psychological response to morally challenging situations such as those of 
moral constraint or moral conflict, or both.’ (Fourie 2015, p.97) 
 
In a similar way, a recent target article in AJOB by Campbell et al (2016) takes the reader 
through six cases involving ethical challenges that the authors suggest give rise to a kind of 
moral distress that is not captured by Jameton’s definition. They describe them as ‘a wider 
range of cases that can sensibly be framed as moral distress’ (Campbell et al 2016, p.2). In 
brief, these cases relate to situations involving moral uncertainty, ethical dilemmas, moral 
bad luck as well as the moral constraint that Jameton pays attention to and are claimed to 
give rise to different kinds of moral distress such as mild and delayed distress. They argue 
that the definition of moral distress should be broadened so that it covers these scenarios: 
 
‘Moral distress =df one or more negative self-directed emotions or attitudes that 
arise in response to one’s perceived involvement in a situation that one perceives to 
be morally undesirable.’ (Campbell et al 2016, p.6) 
 
However, we suggest that any broadening of the causes of moral distress collapses the very 
important distinction, between situations involving ethical dilemmas where health 
professionals must choose between established but conflicting ethical principles such as 
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autonomy and best interests, and those involving ethical constraints, that Jameton was 
anxious to make. Critically, for Jameton, the morally relevant cause of moral distress is any 
situation involving the constraint of moral agency, whereas the morally relevant cause of 
moral puzzlement and/or uncertainty is being in situations involving moral dilemmas 
(Jameton 1984, 1993). In contrast to situations of moral distress, moral dilemmas do not 
hinder (or impede), but challenge moral agency until a morally preferable option is 
determined. Granted, Jameton’s definition conflating cause and response has led to some 
confusion. However, it is important to retain his distinction between the cause(s) of 
puzzlement and uncertainty and the cause(s) of moral distress. There might well be 
situations that give rise to both – a person might feel uncertain as to how to respond to 
competing moral obligations that an ethical dilemma gives rise to and they may also 
experience moral distress if they  perceive themselves to be compelled to opt for one 
solution to the moral dilemma rather than the other. However, Jameton’s point is that 
feeling compelled or constrained is a necessary condition of moral distress. By contrast, 
feeling uncertain or hesitating about ethical principles and values in a given situation is not. 
For Jameton, situations involving moral constraint and moral distress prompt questions 
about moral responsibility and agency that moral agents cannot evade more than questions 
about balancing principles or values. In such situations, we might ask e.g.  
‘What is possible for me to do?’ 
‘What is the extent of my responsibility?’ 
‘What personal risks are health professionals obligated to take for patients?’ 
‘[T]o what extent should I share the blame? [for shared decisions that lead to harm?]’ 
(Jameton 1993, p.545] 
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Jameton is mindful of the way in which moral responsibility can be understood. As he puts it, 
‘The moral questions of responsibility in a bureaucratic setting are central to ethics, so moral 
distress deserves close attention.’ (Jameton 1993, p.543). An exemplary application of this 
perspective comes from Mary Corley, one of the early empirical researchers to 
operationalize Jameton’s account of moral distress and assess its prevalence in nursing 
practice. Corley saw her research as an antidote to what she viewed was the overly attentive 
gaze of traditional ethics approaches on the process of ethical decision making without due 
regard to the institutional context within which ethical decisions are made (Corley 2002). 
 
Unlike Fourie and Campbell et al, we believe that it is important to retain the narrow focus 
of Jameton’s definition i.e., that the term moral distress should be applied to the psycho-
emotional-physiological responses of an individual who feels unable to act in a way that they 
believe to be consistent with deeply held ethical values, principles or moral commitments 
because of institutional or other constraints. In situations involving moral distress, the moral 
agent believes that moral norms are being violated and, at the same time, feels unable to 
act otherwise. In sum, both ‘belief in moral wrongdoing’ and ‘constraint’ are necessary 
conditions of moral distress. Waiving either one of these two conditions – and thereby 
‘broadening’ the definition – fails  to acknowledge the normative and epistemological 
difference between, on the one hand, a constrained moral agency (the moral agent holds a 
belief about what the right thing to do is but feels unable to do it) and, on the other hand, a 
challenged moral agency (the moral agent does not hold a belief about what the right thing 
to do is because they are unsure or conflicted). Admittedly, in the moral realm of clinical 
practice, it may not always be easy to clearly distinguish one from the other. Here, ethics 
consultation has been proven to support multi-disciplinary teams in this work of clarification 
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and effective negotiation. In their rejection of Campbell et al’s proposal to broaden the 
concept of moral distress, Epstein et al (2016) draw on their experience as ethics and moral 
distress consultants to point out how a ‘broadened’ concept of moral distress is also not as 
readily amenable to operationalization, empirical interrogation and possible resolution. They 
suggest that distinguishing the experiences of moral distress and compromised integrity 
from other kinds of moral challenges among health professionals prompts leaders and 
organisations to adopt different strategies for repair and resolution. In turn, they suggest 
that interventions to address moral distress among health professionals are likelier to be 
more successful at measuring its impact on patient outcomes if its original narrower 
defintion is retained.  
 
 This albeit ‘narrow’ view gets at a particular feature of the lived experience of many health 
professionals and it is a particular strength of Jameton’s account of moral distress that it 
brings this feature to the fore. Fourie’s and Campbell et al’s definitions of moral distress, on 
the other hand, obfuscate precisely this experience. Other  authors, who take a similar 
approach to Fourie and Campbell et al such as Morreim’s earlier target article in AJOB 
(Morreim 2015) and several of the commentaries on it (Shelton & White 2015; Spike 2015), 
also cast moral distress in very broad terms e.g., ‘Moral distress is best understood as a clash 
of “bedrock” values and/or bedrock beliefs’ (Morreim 2015, p.39). Like Fourie, these authors 
are concerned about moral distress among health professionals, however, they pay little 
attention to the way in which institutional and/or socio-political structures enable or 
undermine their moral agency. There is a danger then, that unless theoretical and empirical 
research pays explicit attention to the role of these externals constraints, they will be 
rendered invisible and the opportunity for research on moral distress to identify  ‘morally 
	 11	
uninhabitable workplaces in which incoherent understandings and unsustainable practices 
exist’ would be lost (Peter & Liaschenko 2013, p.339).   
 
Moral distress and moral emotions 
We agree with Fourie, in the interests of clarity, that we need to distinguish between the 
phenomenon of moral constraint from the emotions that it prompts. The  standard view of 
moral distress that we want to retain represents the emotional suffering of health 
professionals who feel compelled to compromise their moral integrity in clinical contexts 
and in response to institutional and other external constraints that manifestly hinder moral 
agency. By describing moral distress in this way, we do not contend that situations involving 
moral uncertainty or moral dilemmas cannot be stressful also. However, such stress may 
manifest itself quite differently and should be carefully addressed by ethics educators in the 
clinical and educational context, prompt further self-reflection, dialogue and 
interprofessional learning with the aim of deepening understanding of the situation. 
The extant research on moral distress generally links it with emotions such as guilt, regret, 
shame and anger and to related feelings such as frustration and anxiety as well as 
physiological responses such as crying and sleeplessness. (Huffman & Rittenmeyer 2012;  
McCarthy & Gastmans 2015; Oh & Gastmans 2013; Wilkinson 1987/88).  It might be helpful 
to explicitly describe these emotions as ‘moral emotions’ as they have been associated with 
moral failure since they were first mooted by Aristotle in his account of akrasia, or 
‘weakness of will’ (c.340BCE [1941]). The idea that emotions such as guilt and shame may 
accompany moral decision making has also been articulated by several more contemporary 
philosophers (Greenspan 1995; Taylor 1985; Williams 1993). Bernard Williams, for example, 
links these emotions with what he calls anangkē, or ‘constraint exercised by the power of 
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others’ (1993, p.45), a view that bears more than a passing resemblance to the standard 
account of moral distress.  
The literature on moral emotions is vast and it is beyond the scope of this paper to engage 
with it in any meaningful way. However, it is important to note the link that philosophers 
and empirical researchers make between moral emotions and moral judgement and action. 
As early as 1759, for example, Adam Smith suggested that moral emotions, such as guilt and 
shame, motivate people to pay more attention to other people’s interests (Smith 1982). 
While the individual who experiences these feelings may find them uncomfortable, research 
indicates that they function to stimulate prosocial behaviours (de Hooge, Breugelmans, & 
Zeelenberg 2008). Haidt (2003) defines moral emotions as ‘other-centered’ and as: ‘those 
emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of 
persons other than the judge or agent’ (Haidt 2003, p.852). His work also lends weight to the 
claim that particular moral emotions are elicited by specific situations such as witnessing 
unnecessary suffering or the unjust actions of colleagues and that, in turn, these emotions 
can prompt both reparative and avoidance responses. Research on moral distress also 
supports this view. Exploring what they call, ‘moral stress’ Lützén et al. suggest that it can be 
understood as an ‘energizing factor(s) resulting in a satisfactory feeling of accomplishment 
of professional goals’ (Lützén, Conqvist & Magnusson 2003, p.315). The experience of moral 
distress makes individuals more aware and reflective about the limits put to their moral 
agency by external constraints, but it also raises the awareness about, their own moral, 
spiritual and philosophical beliefs and it can strengthen their resolve to do better next time 
(Corley et al. 2005; Hamric, Borchers & Epstein 2012; Hanna 2004;  Lützén, Conqvist & 
Magnusson 2003). 
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Conclusion 
The standard view of moral distress, supports and foregrounds the role of moral emotions in 
moral decision-making and signals the variety of ways in which moral agency can be enabled 
or limited in institutional settings and socio-cultural contexts. The definition of moral 
distress by Jameton may be imperfect, but, it seems to us to be a good ‘fit’ with the working 
lives of today’s health professionals, indeed many workers, whose moral agency is 
increasingly hostage to the exigencies of economic efficiencies, corporate management 
structures and limited resources.  No doubt many people are successful in negotiating the 
challenges of contemporary healthcare systems with their moral integrity intact. However, it 
seems clear that the moral terrain they must traverse is becoming increasingly more 
treacherous. This necessitates broadening the theoretical and empirical remit of traditional 
medical/healthcare ethics and calls for an explicit integration of accounts of moral distress in 
ethical frameworks and policies. In addition,  professional bodies should provide through 
their regulations and codes orientative knowledge that support professionals in responding 
to the kind of constraints that lead to moral distress and in restoring moral agency and 
equanimity in situations where moral integrity and wellbeing is threatened or lost (see, for 
example, the Canadian Nursing Code 2017). Including concepts such as moral distress and 
developing professional, educational and institutional strategies and policies that are 
socially, emotionally and politically more intelligent and informed would make acting 
ethically more achievable and the personal cost of doing so to the well-being of health 
professionals and the patients in their care more bearable.  
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